Armistice! — How the First World War ended

How the First World War came to an end after just over four years of bitter conflict.

In the early hours of the 11th of November 1918, the German armistice negotiation team signed the document that brought about an immediate ceasefire at 11am French time. But before we get into the detail of the events of the day, let’s take a look back at the events that brought the Germans to the armistice negotiations in the first place.

The fortunes of war had ebbed back and forth over the previous years of conflict. From the very beginning of the war, as political flashpoints compelled the nations of Europe to mobilise their forces, the events of the world war had seldom developed according to their plans. In fact, the mobilisations of the various armies were probably the last bit of the war where events had actually gone to plan!

In 1914, the Germans, anxious to avoid a war on two fronts, had mobilised rapidly and invaded Belgium and France in an attempt to knock France out of the war before Russia was able to bring her enormous manpower reserves into the field. The attempt failed and the Western Front stagnated into relatively static, escalating, trench warfare. Germany, now faced with war on two fronts, developed a clear superiority in defensive warfare and weathered repeated French and British attacks through 1915 before, in early 1916 unleashing their main attempt to knock out the French at Verdun. The Battle of Verdun morphed into an attritional slog with the German high command stating that their intention was to bleed the French army dry.

France just about held on, preventing the Germans from breaking through but suffering losses of nearly 377,000 men. The Germans also lost heavily at Verdun and suffered yet more casualties as the British launched her new army into their great offensive on the Somme in Summer 1916 in an attempt to relieve the pressure on the French.

By 1917, things looked bleak for the allies. The French army was suffering from outbreaks of mutiny and was largely spent as an offensive force. On the Eastern Front, the Germans finally achieved their early war aim of knocking Russia out of the war. As revolution swept across Russia, Germany was able to inflict a humiliating defeat on the Bolshevik government and finally free up her armies to fight in the West.

Then, as the Allies lost one ally with vast manpower reserves but serious limitations, they gained another. America had long held onto isolationist policies, but the onset of German unrestricted submarine warfare that killed American citizens, coupled with skilful diplomacy by the British brought them into the war. America was an industrial powerhouse with enormous manpower reserves, but her army was inexperienced compared with the battle-hardened armies fielded by the other Allies. The American contribution had the potential to make a great difference, but it would take time for them to become truly effective.

The race was now on, Could Germany pull back troops from the Eastern Front quick enough to deliver a knockout blow in the west before American ascendancy began to make itself felt? This strategic situation led Germany to launch four great offensives in the spring of 1918 to bring their temporary numeric superiority to best effect before time ran out. Known as the Kaiserschlecht, or the Kaiser’s Battle, the offensives were to throw the Allies into desperate defence as Germany achieved a massive tactical success but, these same offensives were to sow the seeds of Germany’s eventual defeat.

The Kaiserschlect offensives were really the beginning of the end, so here let’s get into a little more detail.

Operation Michael was the main attack, smashing into the Allied line at the point where the British and French armies met. The Germans plan was to punch a hole through the Allied front lines and then execute a flanking movement against the British army, rolling them back onto their supply lines. Additional offensives were then intended to prevent the Allies from reinforcing from other less hard-pressed parts of the front.

Launched on March the 21st 1918, the Kaiserschlect attack was supported by an enormous artillery effort that fired well over a million shells in a five hour period. Attacking through fog, the Germans broke through the lines in several places and forced the British 5th army back in disarray.

Operation Michael set out the pattern for the subsequent operations as the German army attacked with greater success than any other belligerent on the Western Front to date. The Germans adopted new flexible tactics that used well-trained “storm troops” to break through the front lines and then push into the enemy’s territory, leaving strongpoints isolated for following troops to mop up.

The success of the initial thrust threw the allies into crisis and brought the prospect of German victory into sharp focus. However, the German attacks lacked strategic intent beyond the initial breakthroughs and were more opportunistic than anything else. Perhaps if the new-found ability of the German army to breakthrough the allied lines had been coupled with achievable strategic objectives and innovative ways of keeping the army supplied the outcome would have been different. But it wasn’t, and the German offensive ground to a halt in April around the River Marne as the allies allowed land of little strategic value to be traded for time and husbanded their reserves for eventual counter attack.

By August the allies were in a position to counter-attack and began a series of offensives using advanced artillery techniques, tanks and reinforcements from other theatres, as well as the rapidly growing US Army. A series of sequential blows at various strategic points resulted in victories that pushed the Germans back over much of the ground they had taken in their offensive and pushed the German army to the point where the German high command knew that they were staring defeat in the face.

Overnight on the 4th / 5th of October 1918, Prince Max of Baden, Germany’s new Chancellor, sent a note to the Americans via Switzerland requesting that armistice discussions take place. The news that the request had been made rippled through German military and civil society, rapidly weakening the German position still further.

On the 8th of October, President Wilson rejected the armistice note from the Germans, stating that the Germans had to agree to withdraw from occupied territory as a precondition for talks. By the 12th, the President had received suitable reassurances that the Germans were accepting the 14 point plan he had first announced in January. The Germans agreed this, mainly because they needed an armistice whatever the cost, but also because on the face of it, a return to pre-war borders would mean that she might, in theory, retain Alsace-Lorraine.

By the 17th of October, Ludendorff was advocating a withdrawal to a defensive line on the Meuse that would allow Germany to hold off the allies until winter halted their advance. A day later, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, one of Germany’s most senior military leaders, was writing to Prince Max explaining the crippling shortages of men and material and stating that “We must obtain peace before the enemy breaks into Germany”. It was obvious to Germany’s leaders that the only way to preserve their way of life was to gain some kind of relief from the crushing pressure their nation found itself under. The need for an armistice was becoming critical.

With reassurance from the Germans that they were prepared to adhere to his political programme in hand, President Wilson then wrote to the French and British governments on the 23rd suggesting that they prepare their armistice terms.

By this time, social unrest was breaking out across Germany as an accelerated call up for the conscription of those born in 1900 was issued. Army postal censorship shows that morale had taken a hit when it was announced that the government was seeking an armistice; however the news was presented, the people of Germany could see that the decision to seek an armistice tantamount to an admission of defeat. An attempt to put the German High Seas Fleet to sea on the 29th to provoke a decisive battle with the British resulted in a mutiny and the abandonment of the operation.

As well as unrest on the home front, Germany’s allies were beginning to collapse around her. The Turks, one of the Germans most reliable allies, stopped fighting on the 31st of October when the Treaty of Mudros came onto effect. Also on the 31st of October, the Ottoman Empire ceased to fight when its armistice with the allies came into effect. The Austrians signed their armistice on the 3rd of November, with hostilities ending 24 hours later.

As an isolated Germany bent under the pressure, Kaiser Wilhelm left Berlin for the Belgian town of Spa on the 31st of October as debate raged about his future. Politically he was under pressure to abdicate, perhaps in favour of his son. Other voices suggested that he should go to the front and seek a glorious death fighting for the fatherland; it’s not clear how keen the Kaiser was on this particular idea! On the 2nd of November, German soldiers being transferred from the Eastern Front to the west mutinied rather than going into battle, whilst two days later, 20,000 soldiers in Kiel threw their lot in with the revolutionary sailors.

Throughout early November, sailors at ports across the country were continuing to revolt, leading Admiral von Hintze to travel to Spa on the 8th to report to the Kaiser that the German Navy was no longer following orders. Late in October, Ludendorff had been dismissed and General Wilhelm Groener put in his place; Groener began a tour of the front and by the 6th of November reported to the Kaiser that an armistice had to be in place by the 9th of November to stave off a complete collapse.

Moving back to Wilson’s suggestion that the allies prepare their terms, let’s look at some of the political considerations in the allies’ minds. It important to understand that the allies weren’t just looking for an end to the war and were wary of accepting Wilson’s 14 points. Each nation brought a strong element of realpolitik to play as they sought to ensure a favourable peace that was in their national interests.

On the French side, Foch had written to Prime Minister Clemenceau that the aim of the ceasefire terms should be to “put in our hands sanctions that will guarantee that in the peace negotiations we obtain the conditions that we wish to impose upon the enemy”. Conscious that France was fading militarily, he was determined to establish facts on the ground that would put them in good stead for the future peace treaty negotiations. Whilst Clemenceau railed against military interference in political issues, the general view in the country supported Foch’s position.

The British were quick to insist that military considerations, as determined by the military leaders, should be given equal consideration to political decision making. However, Lloyd George found himself in a minority in his cabinet in advocating the most punishing terms possible. The British were also concerned that, with American power increasing, their relative influence at the negotiation table would decline and their chance of achieving a favourable “British” peace would diminish over time. As such, an armistice now was likely to be materially better than one discussed later.

Woodrow Wilson struggled to balance his political views, his desire to establish a new framework for peace, and the facts on the ground. As the American position evolved and the Germans shifted their position, specifically on democratisation and de-militarisation, the basis of an American and German agreement began to emerge. Coupled with the fear that, as the British and French achieved ascendency over Germany, his own bargaining position would degrade, Wilson was now in a position where he needed to push for peace in order to establish his new world order.

With the Germans, British, French and Americans all believing that an armistice was in their interests, it became likely that the war could end. It’s important to remember that, up until this point, every belligerent believed that they were better off pursuing the war than in seeking peace. Wars without a decisive outcome need political solutions and now, with the political position favourable for peace, all that was left was for the terms to be agreed.

The Allied commanders met in Paris between the 29th of October and the 4th of November and discussed the terms that they would bring to the table in any armistice and peace discussions.

As with all the allies, the British position evolved over time. Lloyd George started from a position that Germany should be thoroughly and utterly defeated before peace was discussed, otherwise there was a chance that Germany would have to be fought again within the next 20 years; with hindsight, how right he was!

Haig was of the opinion that the military position would be very difficult if the war continued. He maintained that the Germans had proved that they were still and formidable force and were well-able to defend their borders. He reasoned that attempting to pursue draconian terms could result in the breakdown of talks and this would result in the need to conquer Germany in a series of costly military operations. Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, whilst sharing Haig’s concerns, was more hawkish and was determined that the armistice should leave the Germans unable to fight on. As the pre-eminent Naval power, the view from the Admirals Beatty and Wemyss at the Admiralty was that any peace should leave Britain’s naval superiority in place. The final terms clearly reflect this priority, with care being taken to ensure that the German fleet did not end up in American hands.

Foch was also of the opinion that Germany should not be allowed the wherewithal to regroup and fight on. The French took the lead on the terms relating to the conflict on land, proposing extensive military sanctions that would hamstring the German military.

Pershing was more hawkish than the British or French commanders. He favoured pushing on for total victory and defeating the Kaiser on his own soil, perhaps because he felt that his army could only get stronger and stronger, however, his view carried a lot less weight than that of his political masters in Washington.

Throughout these discussions, one thread can be traced through. Each country was conscious that the armistice terms would establish the “facts on the ground” for the peace negotiations that would follow. It was widely recognised, at least amongst the British and French leadership that, once the armistice was in place, it would be very difficult to restart the war should peace negotiations fail and therefore the most advantageous position should be achieved ahead of the talks.

Around midnight on the 7th November, Paul von Hindenburg sent a request to Marshal Foch.

The German Government, having been informed through the President of the United States that Marshal Foch had received powers to receive accredited representatives of the German Government and communicate to them conditions of an armistice, the following plenipotentiaries have been named by it:

Mathias Erzberger, General H. K. A. von Winterfeld, Count Alfred von Oberndorff, General von Gruennel, and Naval Captain von Salow.

The plenipotentiaries request that they be informed by wireless of the place where they can meet Marshal Foch. They will proceed by automobile, with subordinates of the staff, to the place thus appointed.

The two leaders exchanged telegrams arranging the time and place, culminating, with Hindenburg stating the practical complexity of crossing the front lines.

From the German outposts to the French outposts our delegation will be accompanied by a road-mending company to enable automobiles to pass the La Capelle road, which has been destroyed.

The German delegation left the Belgian town of Spa on the 7th of November, heading to the agreed crossing point on the Chimay-Fourmies-La Capelle-Guise road. They crossed the front lines and were escorted into French territory. Travelling in 5 cars, the delegation was escorted, after a long drive through devastated territory, to a waiting train in which they travelled through the night, waking the next morning in the Forêt de Compiègne.

Heading the German delegation was Matthias Erzberger of the Catholic Centre Party and a known advocate of peace; the German High Command hoped that sending Erzberger instead of a Prussian officer would result in a more acceptable outcome. Erzberger was accompanied by representatives of the German Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry, Major-General Detlev von Winterfeldt, Captain Ernst Vanselow and Count Alfred von Oberndorff.

The German delegation were ushered into a railway dining car that was positioned in a forest clearing. Waiting to receive them were Marshal Foch, the commander of all Allied forces and Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemsyss, Britain’s First Sea Lord. Respectively, they represented the Allies negotiating position for the war on the land and the sea.

Foch received them with formal courtesy but the atmosphere was chilly. The talks began with a lengthy presentation of the Allies’ 34 preconditions for an armistice. With translations, the whole process took about two hours and made it abundantly clear that this was to be very much an allied peace.

The first eleven clauses in section 1 covered the military situation, mainly on the Western Front. Clauses 1,2 and 3 dealt with the cessation of hostilities six hours after the signing of the armistice and covered the withdrawal of German troops from the occupied territories of Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg within 14 days of the ceasefire. Any German soldiers left after that timeframe were to become prisoners of war, at the same time all Allied prisoners of war were to be repatriated.

The fourth clause contained a list of demands for the surrender of war material, such as guns and transport that was to be handed over the allies. These demands were designed to weaken the German war making capability by robbing her of heavy weaponry and ability to manoeuvre.

The fifth clause covered the withdrawal of German troops from occupied territory and the establishment an army of occupation on German territory west of the Rhine. Here Foch included aggressive timescales for the German withdrawal. These timescales were designed to put enormous pressure on the Germans, forcing them to retreat in disarray that would result in much of their heavy equipment being abandoned.

The allies were to follow behind the German army as it withdrew and were to hold bridgeheads across the Rhine allowing an easier invasion of Germany in the event that hostilities were resumed. In addition to withdrawal, clauses 6, 7 and 8 prohibited the kind of “scorched earth” withdrawal that the Germans had used earlier in the war, ensuring that transport and other infrastructure was left undamaged, as well as protecting the inhabitants of the liberated regions from harm or forced migration. As a part of the withdrawal, any delayed action explosives or mines left in situ had to be declared, as well as the locations of any poisoned wells that had been damaged before the armistice terms came into effect.

Clause 9 required Germany to foot the bill for any allied occupation forces on German territory while clause 10 covered the immediate repatriation of prisoners of war. Finally, the last of the military clauses in section 1 covered the care of injured personnel already under the care of German medical facilities.

Sections 2 and 3 of the terms covered Germany’s Eastern frontier and African forces, governing withdrawals, restrictions on German action and imposing complete freedom of movement for the allies.

Section 4 contained 2 clauses relating to repatriation of civilians and, importantly, the establishment of reparations to pay for damage caused by Germany as well as the return of gold reserves taken during the war.

Section 5 was all about naval matters and contained 13 separate clauses. Broadly speaking, the naval terms opened with similar clauses to those for the land conflict, covering the cessation of all fighting, return of prisoners and declaring the location of all naval forces. In addition, the German government was ordered to communicate the cessation of hostilities to neutral countries, signalling the end of any threat to their shipping.

The next two clauses, 22 and 23, were sweeping and affected the entire German navy. Perhaps as an indication of the pain that the submarine campaign had caused the allies, the U-boats were addressed first. All submarines were to be interned in neutral ports of the allies’ choosing. Similarly, all the major vessels of the surface fleet was to to be interned, with specific numbers of capital ships included in the armistice terms. However, the terms included lesser ships as well; all other naval surface ships, even river craft, were to be concentrated in German naval yards ready for disarmament. Later clauses covered the surrender of all naval aircraft, covering fixed wing aircraft and much of the Zeppelin fleet as well as the return of any other nations’ merchant shipping held by the Germans.

Clause 24 specifically covered the declaration of marine minefields and allies’ right to sweep them clear, while 25 covered the minefields of the Baltic sea. Here the situation was complicated by the existence of land fortifications as well as sea minefields to control the sea lanes. The allies were to be given sweeping and unfettered access to occupy and clear these obstructions as they saw fit.

As a part of the allies’ intention to keep their boot firmly on the German military’s neck, the British blockade, which had brought the Germans to the point of starvation, was to be maintained with no anticipated end point. The allies would control what supplies would be allowed to enter the country entirely at their discretion. At the same time, any restrictions imposed on neutral powers by Germany in relation to import and export were to be lifted and the neutral powers were to be informed that they were free to trade with the allies.

Clauses 28 and 29 covered the evacuation of the Belgian coastline and the Black Sea ports and an obligation not to destroy or remove the infrastructure of those regions.

The naval terms were completed by terms preventing Germany from destroying her own naval assets or from trying to circumvent the armistice terms by transferring those assets to neutral powers in order to avoid surrender.

Section 6 related to the armistice itself, covering how it was to be governed and setting its duration at 30 days with the potential to extend it.

The German delegation was taken aback by the sweeping nature of the terms presented to them. They had hoped that they would be able to negotiate an armistice that would leave their armed forces more or less intact, allowing them to withdraw in good order to deal with the social unrest and threat of a Bolshevik revolution at home. However, these terms made it clear that the allies had no intention of leaving the German military in a functional state and, by implication, little interest in the state of the German home front. This was to be very much the allies’ peace.

In addition to the military clauses, there was a final sting in the tail, a deadline set in Section 7; The Germans had just 72 hours to make up their minds and sign the armistice. An attempt by the Germans to request a further day on the grounds that various arms of government and parliament needed ratify the armistice was dismissed out of hand.

Once shared, the terms of the armistice were carried across the front lines to the German government and to Chancellor Ebert. By November the 10th, incidentally the same day that Kaiser Wilhelm departed Spa for exile in Holland, Chancellor Ebert had agreed to the terms and radioed “the German government accepts the conditions of the armistice communicated to it on the 8th of November.”

However the negotiations were not over. Hindenburg intervened, expressing concerns about parts of the settlement. He was specifically concerned that the allies’ demands concerning lorries and railway carriages would make it difficult to keep the economy running. As well as concerns about the economy, the need to deal with the threat of a Bolshevik revolution was highlighted; could Germany retain more weaponry, particularly machine guns, to allow the army to intervene on the home front?

As well as these practical matters, the numbers of aircraft that were to be surrendered was disputed as impractical; losses had been such that Germany simply didn’t have the number demanded. Finally, it was requested that the German army be allowed to march on a more direct route into Germany via Holland in order to save time. Hindenburg instructed Erzberger to push as hard as he could for these concessions but if push came to shove, they were to sign the armistice; Germany simply couldn’t risk the war continuing.

The final round of talks began at 2 a.m. on the 11th of November. Erzberger was able to present Hindenburg’s arguments and did achieve some concessions to the allied demands; although these didn’t amount to much. In the end, the number of Aircraft to be surrendered was reduced by 300 to 1700. Germany was also permitted to keep 5000 of the 30,000 machine guns demanded and half of the total lorries included in the terms. Finally, the neutral zone that was to be established to the east of the Rhine was narrowed to allow German troops to remain the Ruhr region and the amount of time that the Germans had for their withdrawal over the Rhine was extended by 6 days.

At ten past five in the morning on the 11th of November, the armistice was signed. The German delegation read a prepared statement protesting about the harshness of the terms for the people of Germany and concluding that “a nation of seventy millions can suffer, but it cannot die.” Foch’s response was a terse “tres bien”. Following the signatures, a photograph was taken and the delegates dispersed.

At about 5.30am Foch sent the news to the allied and American commanders; “Hostilities will cease on the entire front November 11th at 11.00am French time.” The news of the ceasefire was passed out along the fronts. In some areas combat operations all but ceased with nothing but sporadic shell fire and a “live and let live” approach from both sides. But in other areas, the war continued as usual, either because the news had not reached them yet or because commanders were keen to achieve specific objectives ahead of the deadline.

Foch himself was on record as stating that the allies were to “pursue the field greys until the last minute”. British troops, led by General Freyburg, completed an operation to capture a bridge over the River Dendre at Lessines, racing to complete the mission before the ceasefire. The Americans in particular launched some major attacks in the small hours of the 11th. The US Marines suffered 1,100 casualties as they tried to cross the River Meuse while the 89th division took over 300 casualties as they took the village of Stenay.

RAF units were instructed to ensure that any combat operations in the run up to the armistice had to be completed by 11am and any aircraft should be back over allied lines before the ceasefire came into effect. American long range 14 inch railway guns fired their last shell at 1057 and 30 seconds so that the shell would complete its flight before the fateful hour. With about two minutes to the ceasefire, a German machine gunner symbolically fired a complete belt of ammunition near some South African troops, he then stood up, removed his helmet, bowed and withdrew.

All in all, there were over 10,000 men wounded, killed or posted missing on the last day of the war. The total number is unclear, especially on the German side but certain examples stand out.

On the British side, Private George Edwin Ellison, serving with the 5th Royal Irish Lancers was killed at 9.30 that morning on the outskirts of Mons In Belgium. The last French fatality of the war was Augustin Trébuchon who was unlucky enough to be shot at 1050h as he ran a message up to his compatriots on the River Meuse to tell them that hot soup would be served once the ceasefire began.

Private George Lawrence Price, a Canadian soldier, was killed by a German sniper at 1058 as his unit moved into the town of Ville-sur-Haine in Belgium while Henry Gunther, an American soldier was killed at 11.59 am and is widely regarded as the last soldier killed before the armistice. Gunther had been demoted from his rank as Sergeant and, as his unit advanced, came under fire and stopped moving, he charged towards German positions firing sporadic shots at the Germans. The Germans, knowing that the ceasefire was imminent, attempted to wave him away but to no avail. Gunther was shot as he approached too close to a machine gun.

On the German side, there is no clear view of the final casualties but one Lieutenant Tomas is generally cited as the final casualty. Tomas was approaching American troops to tell them that his unit was retreating and they were welcome to take over a house they can been occupying.

While the allies dictated the terms, many in the German army were unaware of wider strategic situation. Even on the 11th, General von Einem was to tell his troops in the German Third Army that “Firing has ceased. Undefeated… you are terminating the war in enemy territory.” The message amongst many of the German commanders was clear; the German army had not been defeated in the field. The absence of a clear defeat and the sight of German soldiers returning to Germany from Belgium and France in good order helped to sow the seeds of the “stab in the back” myth that maintained that the German army had been betrayed by the politicians.

However, it should be remembered that the reason the German army was not beaten in the field because the armistice was sought in time. Revolution or not, the army was perilously close to the end of its ability to fight and it was only a matter of time before it would be defeated, no matter how skilled its generals.

The pace of events at the end of the war is reminiscent of the beginning of the conflict in August 1914, when a sequence of events overwhelmed the ability of politicians to control the situation. By 1918, despite both allied and German assumptions that the war would continue into 1919, the Central Powers suddenly reached the end of their ability to maintain a coherent defence and, once the Austrians and Turks had sought an armistice, the German high command found themselves out of control and forced to accept whatever terms would end the war.

It was this sequence of events that, after millions of deaths and untold suffering, would lead to the armistice negotiations in the Forêt de Compiègne.

The clearing in the forest where the armistice was signed became a pilgrimage site between the wars with a stone memorial that stated;

HERE,

ON 11 NOVEMBER 1918,

SUCCUMBED THE CRIMINAL PRIDE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE,

VANQUISHED BY THE FREE PEOPLES

THAT IT SOUGHT TO ENSLAVE

The signing of the armistice document halted the conflict and led to the negotiation of Treaty of Versailles, which, in turn, set the scene for European politics for the next twenty years. Political willpower to keep Germany subjugated wavered, the Nazis took power in Germany and a new conflict led to the fall of France in June 1940. German revenge was complete when they decided that the armistice would be signed in the Forêt de Compiègne, in the same location and railway carriage, completing the French nation’s humiliation.

The Germans then destroyed the site of their great defeat, in a supposedly final act of revenge, but after the war, the French used German prisoners to restore the site. And you can still visit the site today.